恪別𡧲版𢯢𢷮𧵑「戰爭越南」
→美乾預𠓨戰爭東洋
(→演變遶時間) |
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| 𣳔46： | 𣳔46： | ||
{{正|過程乾帖𧵑美𠓨越南（1948-1975）}} | {{正|過程乾帖𧵑美𠓨越南（1948-1975）}} | ||
[[Tập tin:Dien bien phu castor or siege deinterlaced.png|nhỏ|trái|220px|𣛠𩙻C-119𧵑美當且領袖法在[[陣奠邊府]]𢆥1954。]] | [[Tập tin:Dien bien phu castor or siege deinterlaced.png|nhỏ|trái|220px|𣛠𩙻C-119𧵑美當且領袖法在[[陣奠邊府]]𢆥1954。]] | ||
遶材料樓𠄼角、政府美"''擁護願望獨立民族在東南亞"''𥪝𪦆𣎏越南、仍唄條件領導𧵑仍茹渃㵋空擁護主義共産、戶特别擁護役成立各"''[[茹渃非共産]]"''穩定𥪝區域接夾中國。遶[[説Domino]]、美互助各同盟在東南亞底𢶢吏各封嘲𦓡戶朱羅"''力量共産㦖統治洲亞𤲂𢢅𣞻民族。<ref name="pent5">[http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon/pent5.htm The Pentagon Papers, Chapter 2, "U.S. Involvement in the Franco-Viet Minh War, 1950-1955", MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - Harry S. Truman President], trích "Recognition by the United States of the three legally constituted governments of Vietnam, Laos' and Cambodia appears desirable and in accordance with United States foreign policy for several reasons. ''Among them are: encouragement to national aspirations under non-Communist leadership for peoples of colonial areas in Southeast Asia; the establishment of stable non-Communist governments in areas adjacent to Communist China''; ''support to a friendly country which is also a signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty; and as a demonstration of displeasure with Communist tactics which are obviously aimed at eventual domination of Asia, working under the guise of indigenous nationalism''."</ref>美束逐法讓部主義民族在越南、仍𩈘恪戶空體割援助朱法爲𠱊𠅍𠫾同盟𠓀仍媒𢗼𡘯欣在洲歐。縿吏、正冊𧵑美𪞍2𩈘空相釋：𠬠𩈘互助𠊛法戰勝𥪝局戰𢶢[[越盟]] - 卒一羅𤲂事指導𧵑美、𩈘恪美預見𡢐欺戰勝、𠊛法𠱊 - 𠬠革高哿 - 𪮊塊東洋。<ref>[http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon/pent5.htm The Pentagon Papers, Chapter 2, "U.S. Involvement in the Franco-Viet Minh War, 1950-1955"], Trích "''The U.S.-French ties in Europe (NATO, Marshall Plan, Mutual Defense Assistance Program) only marginally strengthened U.S. urgings that France make concessions to Vietnamese nationalism.'' Any leverage from these sources was severely limited by the broader considerations of U.S. policy for the containment of communism in Europe and Asia... To threaten France with economic and military sanctions in Europe in order to have it alter its policy in Indochina was, therefore, not plausible. Similarly, to reduce the level of military assistance to the French effort in Indochina would have been counter-productive, since it would have led to a further deterioration in the French military position there. ''In other words, there was a basic incompatibility in the two strands of U.S. policy: (1) Washington wanted France to fight the anti-communist war and win, preferably with U.S. guidance and advice; and (2) Washington expected the French, when battlefield victory was assured, to magnanimously withdraw from Indochina.''"</ref> | |||
==參考== | ==參考== | ||