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恪別𡧲版𢯢𢷮𧵑「戰爭越南」
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撝對内、在[[花旗|美]]頭十年1950、各勢力[[主義𢶢共|𢶢共]]極端𪫶權、McCarthy 吧Hoover實現各戰役𢶢共𪞍遶唯、分别對處、紗汰、綺訴吧扒㨔𡗉𠊛被䀡羅黨員共産或擁護主義共産<ref>Schrecker, Ellen (2002). The Age of McCarthyism: A Brief History with Documents (2d ed.). Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 0-312-29425-5. p. 63–64</ref><ref>Ellen Schrecker, THE AGE OF MCCARTHYISM: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS, [http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/mccarthy/schrecker3.htm The State Steps In: Setting the Anti-Communist Agenda], trích "''These actions--most important the inauguration of an anti-Communist loyalty-security program for government employees in March 1947 and the initiation of criminal prosecutions against individual Communists--not only provided specific models for the rest of the nation but also enabled the government to disseminate its version of the Communist threat.''", Boston: St. Martin's Press, 1994</ref><ref>Ellen Schrecker, THE AGE OF MCCARTHYISM: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS, [http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/mccarthy/schrecker3.htm The State Steps In: Setting the Anti-Communist Agenda], trích "''Communist defendants were arrested, handcuffed, fingerprinted, and often brought to their trials under guard if they were being held in jail for contempt or deportation.''", Boston: St. Martin's Press, 1994</ref>。𠬠部分𥪝數仍難人被𠅍役、被扒㨔或被調查果實𣎏關係𥪝現在或𥪝過去唄[[黨共産花旗]]。仍大部分群吏𣎏慄𠃣可能𢲧危害朱茹渃吧事聯關𧵑戶唄𠊛共産羅慄𢠩日<ref>Schrecker, Ellen (1998). Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America. Little, Brown. ISBN 0-316-77470-7. p. 4</ref>。政府美譴工眾𢣂哴仍𠊛共産羅媒砥𡃏對唄安寧國家。<ref>Ellen Schrecker, THE AGE OF MCCARTHYISM: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS, [http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/mccarthy/schrecker3.htm The State Steps In: Setting the Anti-Communist Agenda], trích "''The major trials of the period got enormous publicity and gave credibility to the notion that Communists threatened the nation's security.''", Boston: St. Martin's Press, 1994</ref> | 撝對内、在[[花旗|美]]頭十年1950、各勢力[[主義𢶢共|𢶢共]]極端𪫶權、McCarthy 吧Hoover實現各戰役𢶢共𪞍遶唯、分别對處、紗汰、綺訴吧扒㨔𡗉𠊛被䀡羅黨員共産或擁護主義共産<ref>Schrecker, Ellen (2002). The Age of McCarthyism: A Brief History with Documents (2d ed.). Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 0-312-29425-5. p. 63–64</ref><ref>Ellen Schrecker, THE AGE OF MCCARTHYISM: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS, [http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/mccarthy/schrecker3.htm The State Steps In: Setting the Anti-Communist Agenda], trích "''These actions--most important the inauguration of an anti-Communist loyalty-security program for government employees in March 1947 and the initiation of criminal prosecutions against individual Communists--not only provided specific models for the rest of the nation but also enabled the government to disseminate its version of the Communist threat.''", Boston: St. Martin's Press, 1994</ref><ref>Ellen Schrecker, THE AGE OF MCCARTHYISM: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS, [http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/mccarthy/schrecker3.htm The State Steps In: Setting the Anti-Communist Agenda], trích "''Communist defendants were arrested, handcuffed, fingerprinted, and often brought to their trials under guard if they were being held in jail for contempt or deportation.''", Boston: St. Martin's Press, 1994</ref>。𠬠部分𥪝數仍難人被𠅍役、被扒㨔或被調查果實𣎏關係𥪝現在或𥪝過去唄[[黨共産花旗]]。仍大部分群吏𣎏慄𠃣可能𢲧危害朱茹渃吧事聯關𧵑戶唄𠊛共産羅慄𢠩日<ref>Schrecker, Ellen (1998). Many Are the Crimes: McCarthyism in America. Little, Brown. ISBN 0-316-77470-7. p. 4</ref>。政府美譴工眾𢣂哴仍𠊛共産羅媒砥𡃏對唄安寧國家。<ref>Ellen Schrecker, THE AGE OF MCCARTHYISM: A BRIEF HISTORY WITH DOCUMENTS, [http://www.english.illinois.edu/maps/mccarthy/schrecker3.htm The State Steps In: Setting the Anti-Communist Agenda], trích "''The major trials of the period got enormous publicity and gave credibility to the notion that Communists threatened the nation's security.''", Boston: St. Martin's Press, 1994</ref> | ||
==== | ====美干預𠓨戰爭東洋==== | ||
{{正| | {{正|過程干涉𧵑美𠓨越南(1948-1975)}} | ||
[[Tập tin:Dien bien phu castor or siege deinterlaced.png|nhỏ|trái|220px|𣛠𩙻C-119𧵑美當且領袖法在[[陣奠邊府]]𢆥1954。]] | [[Tập tin:Dien bien phu castor or siege deinterlaced.png|nhỏ|trái|220px|𣛠𩙻C-119𧵑美當且領袖法在[[陣奠邊府]]𢆥1954。]] | ||
遶材料樓𠄼角、政府美"''擁護願望獨立民族在東南亞"''𥪝𪦆𣎏越南、仍唄條件領導𧵑仍茹渃㵋空擁護主義共産、戶特别擁護役成立各"''[[茹渃非共産]]"''穩定𥪝區域接夾中國。遶[[説Domino]]、美互助各同盟在東南亞底𢶢吏各封嘲𦓡戶朱羅"''力量共産㦖統治洲亞𤲂𢢅𣞻民族。"''<ref name="pent5">[http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon/pent5.htm The Pentagon Papers, Chapter 2, "U.S. Involvement in the Franco-Viet Minh War, 1950-1955", MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - Harry S. Truman President], trích "Recognition by the United States of the three legally constituted governments of Vietnam, Laos' and Cambodia appears desirable and in accordance with United States foreign policy for several reasons. ''Among them are: encouragement to national aspirations under non-Communist leadership for peoples of colonial areas in Southeast Asia; the establishment of stable non-Communist governments in areas adjacent to Communist China''; ''support to a friendly country which is also a signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty; and as a demonstration of displeasure with Communist tactics which are obviously aimed at eventual domination of Asia, working under the guise of indigenous nationalism''."</ref>美束逐法讓部主義民族在越南、仍𩈘恪戶空體割援助朱法爲𠱊𠅍𠫾同盟𠓀仍媒𢗼𡘯欣在洲歐。縿吏、正冊𧵑美𪞍2𩈘空相釋:𠬠𩈘互助𠊛法戰勝𥪝局戰𢶢[[越盟]] - 卒一羅𤲂事指導𧵑美、𩈘恪美預見𡢐欺戰勝、𠊛法𠱊 - 𠬠革高哿 - 𪮊塊東洋。<ref>[http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon/pent5.htm The Pentagon Papers, Chapter 2, "U.S. Involvement in the Franco-Viet Minh War, 1950-1955"], Trích "''The U.S.-French ties in Europe (NATO, Marshall Plan, Mutual Defense Assistance Program) only marginally strengthened U.S. urgings that France make concessions to Vietnamese nationalism.'' Any leverage from these sources was severely limited by the broader considerations of U.S. policy for the containment of communism in Europe and Asia... To threaten France with economic and military sanctions in Europe in order to have it alter its policy in Indochina was, therefore, not plausible. Similarly, to reduce the level of military assistance to the French effort in Indochina would have been counter-productive, since it would have led to a further deterioration in the French military position there. ''In other words, there was a basic incompatibility in the two strands of U.S. policy: (1) Washington wanted France to fight the anti-communist war and win, preferably with U.S. guidance and advice; and (2) Washington expected the French, when battlefield victory was assured, to magnanimously withdraw from Indochina.''"</ref> | 遶材料樓𠄼角、政府美"''擁護願望獨立民族在東南亞"''𥪝𪦆𣎏越南、仍唄條件領導𧵑仍茹渃㵋空擁護主義共産、戶特别擁護役成立各"''[[茹渃非共産]]"''穩定𥪝區域接夾中國。遶[[説Domino]]、美互助各同盟在東南亞底𢶢吏各封嘲𦓡戶朱羅"''力量共産㦖統治洲亞𤲂𢢅𣞻民族。"''<ref name="pent5">[http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon/pent5.htm The Pentagon Papers, Chapter 2, "U.S. Involvement in the Franco-Viet Minh War, 1950-1955", MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - Harry S. Truman President], trích "Recognition by the United States of the three legally constituted governments of Vietnam, Laos' and Cambodia appears desirable and in accordance with United States foreign policy for several reasons. ''Among them are: encouragement to national aspirations under non-Communist leadership for peoples of colonial areas in Southeast Asia; the establishment of stable non-Communist governments in areas adjacent to Communist China''; ''support to a friendly country which is also a signatory to the North Atlantic Treaty; and as a demonstration of displeasure with Communist tactics which are obviously aimed at eventual domination of Asia, working under the guise of indigenous nationalism''."</ref>美束逐法讓部主義民族在越南、仍𩈘恪戶空體割援助朱法爲𠱊𠅍𠫾同盟𠓀仍媒𢗼𡘯欣在洲歐。縿吏、正冊𧵑美𪞍2𩈘空相釋:𠬠𩈘互助𠊛法戰勝𥪝局戰𢶢[[越盟]] - 卒一羅𤲂事指導𧵑美、𩈘恪美預見𡢐欺戰勝、𠊛法𠱊 - 𠬠革高哿 - 𪮊塊東洋。<ref>[http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/pentagon/pent5.htm The Pentagon Papers, Chapter 2, "U.S. Involvement in the Franco-Viet Minh War, 1950-1955"], Trích "''The U.S.-French ties in Europe (NATO, Marshall Plan, Mutual Defense Assistance Program) only marginally strengthened U.S. urgings that France make concessions to Vietnamese nationalism.'' Any leverage from these sources was severely limited by the broader considerations of U.S. policy for the containment of communism in Europe and Asia... To threaten France with economic and military sanctions in Europe in order to have it alter its policy in Indochina was, therefore, not plausible. Similarly, to reduce the level of military assistance to the French effort in Indochina would have been counter-productive, since it would have led to a further deterioration in the French military position there. ''In other words, there was a basic incompatibility in the two strands of U.S. policy: (1) Washington wanted France to fight the anti-communist war and win, preferably with U.S. guidance and advice; and (2) Washington expected the French, when battlefield victory was assured, to magnanimously withdraw from Indochina.''"</ref> |